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During the 2008 US Presidential election voters in California, as well as 
choosing a president, were asked to withdraw the right of same-sex couples 
to marry, the Californian Supreme Court having, six months previously, 
conferred that right by judicial decision1³3URSRVLWLRQ´aimed to restore the 
definition of marriage to its historical heterosexual limitations, and it passed, 
by a fairly narrow margin.  The feature most remarkable to an outsider during 
the Proposition 8 campaign, was the stunningly apocalyptical terms in which 
the debate was conducted, on both sides of the argument.  The same-sex 
marriage debate is in the United States of America conducted in such 
venomous terms as to leave a European observer quite breathless.  Nancy 
3ROLNRII¶V latest book brings some calm to the discussion.  It is a measured 
and thoughtful contribution to the debate and, though she does not directly 
address the question of why it is so much more contentious in the US than in 
other western jurisdictions, her analysis does shed much light on that puzzling 
question.  There are three main explanations that spring out of this engaging 
book. 
                                            
1
 In Re Marriage Cases 183 P3d 384 (2008). 
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First, in the US there are very few state and federal rules that give any legal 
recognition to informal relationships such as unregistered cohabitation.  US 
family law remains to a very large extent DELQDU\³DOORUQRWKLQJ´V\VWHPZLWK
marriage on the one hand being fully recognised and regulated and the 
repository of all family rights and duties, liabilities and benefits, obligations 
and preferences, and cohabitation and other forms of family life on the other 
hand being ignored except when to do so would provide an unwanted 
incentive to avoid marriage.  (Municipal and commercial organisations do 
mitigate this to some extent).  Other western legal systems, in contrast, have 
over the past 50 years increasingly provided a variety of legal consequences 
for cohabiting couples, ranging from consequences virtually indistinguishable 
from marriage in Australia and New Zealand, through extensive 
consequences but of a value deliberately less than that ascribed to marriage 
in Scotland, to ad hoc but nevertheless important recognitions in England.  
The US is very far behind here and there is no political will to change this 
position.  Secondly, the sheer number of consequences flowing from 
marriage, and therefore the extent of governmental regulation of and control 
over private and family life, is staggering in the US, and far greater than in 
most other developed countries.  As well as the expected tax and social 
security consequences, maintenance obligations, claims on divorce and 
entitlements on death, there is, to European eyes, an astounding array of 
other matters in the US that are fundamentally DIIHFWHG E\ DQ LQGLYLGXDO¶V
status as married or unmarried.  These include work-based insurance and 
pensions, residence permits, planning laws entitlements, access to homeless 
accommodation, and even, bizarrely, eligibility to take state bar exams (on a 
µfitness to practice¶ argument).  A consequence of overwhelming importance, 
political, practical and emotional, in the US concerns health care: marriage 
affects QRW RQO\ DFFHVV WR D SDUWQHU¶V LQVXUDQFH DQG SRZHU WR PDNH SUR[\
health care decisions but also, viciously, hospital visitation rights (in some 
states unmarried fathers are excluded from hospital birthing suites).  And 
thirdly, the same-sex marriage debate provides a virtually impregnable 
dividing line between the forces of the religious Right and those of the 
liberal/egalitarian elite and has of late overshadowed that earlier shibboleth, 
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abortion.  The Right has a touching faith (if we take them at their word) in the 
SRZHU RI PDUULDJH WR VROYH DOO RI VRFLHW\¶V LOOV IURP SRYHUW\ WKURXJK VRFLDO
exclusion and illiteracy, to enforced prostitution, drug addiction, violence and 
high criminality.  The power of the religious Right on the US mindset  -  even 
of those who do not subscribe to Rightist tenets  -  should never be under-
estimated.  There is a conservatism underpinning virtually every aspect of 
American society, way of life and political thought. 
 
Now, none of these factors applies in Europe or Australasia to anything like 
the same extent, if at all, and even in Canada their power is far less than in 
the US.  It follows that the context in which Polikoff is writing is effectively 
alien to her non-US readers.  Nevertheless, her message has a far wider 
resonance and has clear relevance throughout the developed world.  She 
argues powerfully and persuasively that conjugality, as a determinant of rights 
and obligations, is not just socially useless, it is morally bankrupt. 
 
Polikoff sees the marriage debate as focusing on the wrong issue, even 
(perhaps) too easy a target, and she argues that LGBT activists have lost 
their way by being dazzled by that jewel in the crown of heterosexualdom (not 
her word, or even her image)  -  marriage.  But the jewel is false, hollow, an 
empty dream at best, and a siren luring people to their doom at worst.  She 
traces the history of social reform movements from the mid-20th century 
onwards to show the dramatic shifts that have taken place in the position of 
LGBT activists within these movements.  In the 1960s and 1970s, social 
reformers of many ilks tended to see marriage as part of the problem rather 
than the solution.  It was widely recognised that marriage was a patriarchal 
institution that both inculcated and underpinned a gendered and static view of 
society.  A powerful alliance of social reformers, feminists and civil rights 
activists achieved notable successes in this era in changing social 
expectations and norms and as gender equality became more widespread 
throughout the law, marriage too changed from a relationship of gender-
identified support and dependence to one of mutuality and partnership.  But 
marriage was never the only, or even the main, target of this alliance.  Radical 
feminists sought to address issues of power and hierarchy far beyond the 
 4 
private realm of family life; lesbian feminists saw heterosexuality itself as 
underpinning the structures of power and hierarchy.   In the narrow field of 
family law, µthe overarching goal¶, Polikoff says, µwas facilitating social, legal 
and economic support for diverse family forms outside the patriarchal family; 
less marriage, not marriage, was consistent with that view¶S.  Feminism 
never was a single-issue movement and at this period gay rights and the 
IHPLQLVWPRYHPHQWZHUHLQ3ROLNRII¶VYLHZLQH[tricably and powerfully bound 
together.  The theme running throughout her book is that this link has since 
melted away, to the detriment of both elements of what she continues to see 
as the same movement.  Worse, by focusing on marriage to the exclusion of 
wider social reforms, the LGBT agenda has turned its back on its erstwhile 
allies.  The ladder of social justice has in many cases been climbed by gay 
men and lesbians, but they have then kicked it away. 
 
Paradoxically, it was LGBT success that minded them to do so.  The rot set in 
with Braschi v. Stahl Associates2, where the Supreme Court of New York was 
faced with exactly the issue that arose in the English case of Fitzpatrick v. 
Sterling Housing Association3  -  whether the same-sex partner of a deceased 
tenant could inherit the tenancy on the basis of being a member of the 
WHQDQW¶V IDPLOy.  The Court held, as the House of Lords was to do ten years 
later, that the same-VH[SDUWQHUVKLSZDVLQGHHGDµfamily¶ for the purposes of 
the law of succession to tenancies.  This was a great victory on both an 
individual basis and for gay rights generally  -  a worthy and deserving litigant 
was allowed to stay in his home, and a court of law delivered an important 
message about the lack of rational justification for denying equality to those of 
different sexual orientation from the majority.  And yet in 3ROLNRII¶VYLHZ this 
decision took the radical sting out of LGBT strategising.  Society itself was 
shown to need no radical reform: gay men and lesbians could, with little 
thought and no restructuring of institutions, be accommodated within existing 
structures.  LGBT activists started to ask for less, and they limited the 
beneficiaries of these requests to themselves.  In the words of Andrew 
                                            
2
 74 N.Y. 2d 201 (1989). 
3
 [2001] 1 A.C. 27. 
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Sullivan, µa need to rebel has quietly ceded to a desire to belong¶4.   This 
development was consolidated by the decision of the Supreme Court of 
Hawaii in Baehr v. Lewin5, another victory for LGBT rights and at the same 
time a wedge in the spit between LGBT activists and their allies.  For the first 
time a court held that the exclusion of same-sex couples from the institution of 
marriage required to be justified by the state and that the justifications 
traditionally offered  -  and which would subsequently reappear with tedious 
regularity  -  were wholly insufficient.  As is well-known, the legislature in 
Hawaii trumped the Court by changing the state constitution to permit a same-
sex marriage ban, while at the same time introducing a comprehensive 
µdomestic partnership¶ regime which gave same-sex couples, and others, 
virtually everything the plaintiff in Baehr had been seeking.  Nevertheless, the 
message had been given that marriage might, just might, be obtainable for 
same-sex couples and organisations and groups that had earlier paid little 
regard to the marriage debate, concentrating instead on more winnable 
arguments (which also benefited other family forms than the two-person, 
registered, model), came to focus their whole attention on this single but 
ultimately exclusionary issue.  The feminist goal of restructuring the whole of 
society away from a patriarchal mind-set was ditched and gender-neutral 
patriarchy was embraced instead. 
 
Gay conservatives in the 1990s can even be found arguing that same-sex 
marriage is necessary to protect marriage from alternatives such as domestic 
partnership and recognised cohabitation.  Interpreted benignly, this could be 
seen as an attempt to win the gay rights argument by addressing the fears of 
opponents; interpreted more critically  -  DQG LQ 3ROLNRII¶V YLHZ PRUH
realistically  -  this is buying into the very tenets of conservatism that LGBT 
activists used to and feminist activists still do deny.  A win for gay rights 
activists in the strategy to open marriage has the effect of consolidating the 
differences between the married and the unmarried, and this acts to the 
detriment of non-marital families by giving the comforting but false impression 
that family law, having rejected discrimination against gay men and lesbians 
                                            
4
 Sullivan (1989), quoted by Pollikoff at p. 57. 
5
 852 P. 2d 33 (1993). 
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and same-sex couples, has now responded sufficiently to the demands for an 
egalitarian society, and need do no more.  But in truth it fails to address the 
claims to justice of those who cannot or do not want to assimilate into the 
societal norm  -  worse, it renders these claims invisible.  The gay rights 
movement is thus positioned on the wrong side of the cultural war over 
acceptable family structures. 
 
Polikoff has even greater fears.  The assumption of LGBT activists and 
organisations, now increasingly difficult to shift, that marriage is the übergoal 
concedes far too much to the Rightist ideology, for it absolves Government 
from responsibility for wage-stagnation, unemployment, poor health care, sex 
DQGUDFHGLVFULPLQDWLRQDVWKHIRFXVRIVRFLHW\¶VLOOVDuring the Clinton years 
the conservative Right turned to social science rather than religion for 
arguments in favour of marriage, pointing out (with a magisterial disregard for 
what was cause and what was effect) that families suffering marriage 
breakdown and non-marital births were associated with serious social 
problems: the solution was to restore lifelong marriage to its proper place6.  
The second Bush presidency was marked by a return to influence of the 
religious Right.  Faith based organisations for social good were preferenced 
for state funding, in areas like abstinence-only sex education at the expense 
of sexual health care. 
 
3ROLNRII¶V EDVLF DUJXPHQW LV WKDW PDUULDJH LV LUUHOHYDQW ERWK WR WKH VRFLDO
problems that beset American life and to the social goods that offset them.   
7KH 5LJKW¶V IRFXV RQ marriage as a tool by which responsibility for tackling 
social ills can be placed on the individual is self-evidently doomed to failure.  It 
should be obvious to all who are not blinded by an ideological commitment to 
individual responsibility (a.k.a. lower tax bills due to lower social spending by 
government) that cKLOGUHQ¶VHGXFDWLRQFDQEHLPSURYHGmuch more readily by 
good educational policies rather than by encouraging the marriage of their 
parents; crime will be reduced by social policies that tackle poverty, 
unemployment and social exclusion rather than by encouraging everyone to 
                                            
6
 See for example, Spaht (2003); Wardle (2008). 
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marry; racism can be tackled more effectively by state programmes designed 
to tackle racism rather than by encouraging marriage and hoping thereby to 
make people better. 
 
Having made a convincing, even unanswerable, case for rejecting the agenda 
of the Right, Polikoff then offers an agenda of her own.  This is to remove 
marriage, and indeed other manifestations of conjugality, from its role as the 
mechanism for the allocation of rights and responsibilities and to replace it 
ZLWK ZKDW VKH FDOOV D µValuing All Families¶ approach.  Put at its simplest, 
families in all their different constellations should be entitled to equal respect.  
LGBT activists should re-establish their alliance with social reformers and 
radical feminists to achieve goals that bring benefit to all, and not just those 
gay men and lesbians who model their families on the social norm.  Now, she 
makes a very attractive case for this approach, but it seems to me that there 
are three objections that can be made and which she does not address 
adequately. 
 
First, Polikoff is working from the premise that the gay rights agenda ought to 
be rebellious and transformative, that the LGBT lobby lost its way when it 
settled for assimilation rather than change.  True it is that the assimilation of 
gay men and lesbians into mainstream society tends to hide the single most 
important message that the queer gives to the straight  -  that it is OK to be 
different.  True it also is that society as it stands needs to be transformed into 
something radically better and that the destruction of patriarchal structures will 
serve the mutual interests of gay men and lesbians, feminists and women 
generally.  But I am unpersuaded that the very purpose of gay rights is to 
achieve this wider social good, as opposed to the more modest one of 
furthering the interests of gay people.  A wider social justice will doubtless be 
a step nearer when full equality and respect for gay men, lesbians and their 
families is achieved, but membership of the gay community cannot be taken 
to imply subscription to a radical world-view.  Being gay is a matter of 
personhood, not politics.  On the other hand, the success of the campaign for 
same-sex marriage may in fact further, if by a sidewind, a practical 
transformation of profound significance (at least in the US).  The religious 
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Right in that country have invested such emotional and intellectual capital in 
opposing same-sex marriage that their defeat on the issue might well signal a 
terminal decline in their influence.  To me, this is the one persuasive argument 
for supporting same-sex marriage (as opposed to civil partnership). 
 
$VHFRQGSUREOHP WKDW , SHUFHLYH LQ3ROLNRII¶VDUJXPHQW LVKHU denial of the 
need for symbolic victories for gay men and lesbians.  The practical needs of 
gay men and lesbians can be met, she argues, without necessarily adopting a 
gay rights agenda.  There is no need to frighten the horses, for it is the end 
result rather than the process of getting there that is important.  What is 
needed is not results that can be presented as /*%7µvictories¶, but rather a 
broader victory for all families which does not have any particular symbolic 
significance for gay rights.  She is probably right that this might be a more 
effective (or at least quicker) means of achieving good results for gay men 
and lesbians, because it allows tacticians to by-pass opposition based on anti-
gay sentiment  -  though I wonder if the radical transformation of society that 
Polikoff seeks is possible without frightening at least a few horses.  She gives 
an interesting example from Salt Lake City  -  not a natural home for LGBT 
victories.  In 2005 the Mayor of that city wanted a domestic partnership law to 
provide health insurance for all couples (married and unmarried, opposite-sex 
and same-sex).  Gay rights activists strongly and vocally supported this 
proposal, perceiving themselves as the major beneficiaries.  The City Council, 
however, opposed the idea on the ground that it created an alternative status 
which threatened the special place of marriage and the preferred status of 
µmarried couple¶.  What they imposed instead was a scheme whereby every 
LQGLYLGXDOFRXOGQRPLQDWHDµdesignated person¶ as the second beneficiary of 
their own health insurance scheme.  This was ideologically more acceptable 
to the Right, and indeed mRUHSHRSOHZRXOGEHFRYHUHGWKDQ LQ WKH0D\RU¶V
proposals, including same-sex families. Yet gay organisations were 
disappointed, notwithstanding that their constituents achieved the benefit, 
because there was no obvious µvictory¶ for gay rights.  This is the way forward, 
LQ3ROLNRII¶VYLHZ 
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Yet I wonder whether the power of symbolism, encapsulated in such victories, 
can be so readily dismissed as unimportant, or worth ditching to neutralise 
anti-gay opposition.  Symbolism has real and direct effects in the way that gay 
men and lesbians are treated in society irrespective of their actual legal 
position.  The result of the House of Lords decision in Fitzpatrick v. Sterling 
Housing Association, for example, was in practical legal terms minimal, since 
the form of tenancy at iVVXH LQ WKDW FDVHDYDLODEOH WR µfamily¶ members was 
dying out (and has since been abolished).  Yet the case retains immense 
symbolic importance for the clear message it gives to society: there is no 
justification for treating same-sex couples less well than opposite-sex couples.  
7KHGHFLVLRQSDYHGWKHZD\IRUWKH8.¶V&LYLO3DUWQHUVKLS$FWSHUKDSV
even made that legislation inevitable.  Few would deny that the symbolism 
contained in unenforceable legislation such as Section 28 of the Local 
Government Act 1988 µThou shalt not promote homosexuality as a pretended 
family relationship¶) nevertheless had practical effects on society¶VDWWLWXGHVWR
homosexuality and the way people treated gay men and lesbians.  Some 
countries, for historical reasons, need symbols far more than others; the 
United States is a country that thrives on symbolism.  Marriage carries an 
undoubted patriarchal script, but it also declares acceptability, dignity, and 
worth.  The positive symbolism of the word µmarriage¶ and the negative 
symbolism of the doctrine of µseparate but equal¶ institutions had decisive 
resonance for courts in Canada, South Africa, Massachusetts, New Jersey, 
California and Connecticut when they held that µmarriage¶ was demanded by 
the need for equality notwithstanding that the legal distinctions could be dealt 
with by a separate institution such as µcivil union¶. 
 
In the United Kingdom, the need for symbol is less and has been satisfied by 
means other than marriage (which explains why refusing the symbolism of the 
name µmarriage¶ was held not to interfere with the European Convention on 
Human Rights in Wilkinson v. Kitzinger (No 2)7).  The Civil Partnership Act 
2004 was a hugely significant advancement of the legal position of same-sex 
couples, but it was also a repository of symbolism of major proportion and this 
                                            
7
 [2006] E.W.H.C. 2022. 
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should not be forgotten.  The message is given loud and clear that gay men 
and lesbians are worthy of the same legal protection (even if structured 
differently) and therefore of the same social respect as non-gay people: to put 
the same thought another way, the message is that non-gay people are no 
better than gay people.  Hiding the gay rights agenda behind wider social 
reform would remove this message entirely, which is exactly why an attempt 
was made in the House of Lords to do just that as the Civil Partnership Bill 
was being debated. But the attempt failed, and the opposing Parliamentarians 
claimed to mourn for spinster sisters everywhere. 
 
Polikoff joins the mourners (though with more honesty than the likes of 
%DURQHVV 2¶&DLWKDLQ DQG /RUG 7HEELW, for she would include within her 
µfamilies¶ who should be valued the Misses Burden, the spinster sisters in 
Burden v. United Kingdom8.  She would give these wealthy ladies the tax 
break granted to spouses and civil partners.  Yet it is as well to remember that 
these women made no complaint when the tax benefit was limited to spouses.  
It was only when same-sex couples had a means to access it that they asked, 
µif gay people are now as good as married people, why not us too?¶  The 
European Court, of course, answered that question by saying that it was 
acceptable for states to design their tax regimes in such a way as 
distinguishes between those who have made a public  and official declaration 
of commitment to each other, and those who have not.  But to me, the answer 
LV WKDW WKH &LYLO 3DUWQHUVKLS $FW¶V PHVVDJH RI HTXDOLW\ IRU JD\ PHQ DQG
lesbians was as socially important as its legal effects.  This message remains 
essential because elements of society continue to deny, from their pulpits and 
%LVKRSV¶ SDODFHV WKH PRUDO HTXLYDOHQFH RI SHRSOH RI GLIIHUHQW VH[XDO
orientation, and the thugs hear this message and feel aggrieved when they 
are charged with hate crime rather than common assault.  The UK Parliament 
was right to resist attempts to extend the 2004 Act to all couples who wished 
family benefits, for that would have removed this message even while giving 
rights and responsibilities to same-sex couples.  The message, in other 
words, has more importance (in my view) than Polikoff allows. 
                                            
8
 (2007) 44 E.H.R.R. 51 (Chamber); (2008) 47 E.H.R.R. 38 (Grand Chamber). 
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The third, and perhaps most critical flaw, LQ3ROLNRII¶VDUJXPHQWLVWKDW the line 
to be drawn requires, for legal purposes, rather more precision than is 
contained in the word µfamily¶.  Legal rights, obligations, benefits and liabilities 
need to be clear to their obligees and beneficiaries, and to third parties, not 
only for efficiency but also for predictability.  Administrative efficiency may not 
on its own justify inequitable treatment, but its benefits do include allowing 
people to understand their own legal position without judicial determination.  
Marriage, civil partnership and even conjugally defined cohabitation provide a 
bright line between those who can access and those who are excluded from 
family rights and obligations, and the clarity of this line avoids the need for a 
judicial examination of the minutiae of private lives every time a family right is 
claimed or a family-based obligation is imposed.  Now, drawing this line at 
marriage/civil partnership is acceptable only when doing so serves rather than 
hinders the social purpose for which the line is designed.  Wrongful death 
statutes, for example, serve the social purpose of recognising the injury 
caused to family members when a loved one is wrongfully killed and that 
purpose is inhibited by a strict cut-off point at marriage.  So the solution is to 
move the line away from marriage, as happened in the United Kingdom with 
the Administration of Justice Act 1982.  But the line itself was not removed, or 
made flexible or shady.  A clear line remains with both the Scottish and the 
English legislation (somewhat differently) defining with some precision those 
µfamily members¶ entitled to seek compensation for the wrongful death of their 
loved one.  Polikoff of course would support this but she does not indicate 
where her lines are to be drawn.  She does not define, in other words, µfamily¶.  
This cannot be a self-selecting concept, wide enough to include platonic 
friends who co-own their homes, if for no other reason than that friends  -  and 
family  -  sometimes fall out with each other and their mutual interests in 
presenting themselves as a unit may turn into a direct conflict of interests.  A 
definition has to be externally imposed upon the unit, and it must be clear.  
The cost of doing so will always be that some vulnerable individuals will fall on 
the wrong side of the line, but this is a cost that must be borne if the courts 
are not to be clogged up with cases disputing not the claim that is made but 
the nature of the relationship upon which the claim is based.  This is already 
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happening in, for example, Australia, where the definition of µparent¶ has been 
loosened to accommodate lesbian co-parents, and the result has been that 
separating lesbians in custody disputes with each other deny the very nature 
of their ex-SDUWQHU¶VUHODWLRQVKLSZLWKWKHFKLOGWKH\ZHUHEULQJLQJXSWRJHWKHU9.  
And the early indications from Scotland suggests that intURGXFLQJFRKDELWDQWV¶
property rights leads to denials by ex-cohabitants, and by surviving family 
members, that there ever was a cohabitation in the first place. 
 
I think it is implicit in 3ROLNRII¶V argument that µfamily¶ might be defined 
differently, depending upon the legal consequence at issue, in order to ensure 
that the purpose of the consequence is achieved but not abused, but she 
gives no examples.  Nor does she tackle the issue of what type of relationship 
deserves legal benefits or legal liabilities.  Families based on profound 
inequalities, such as the polygamous units of fundamentalist Mormons in the 
VRXWKZHVWRIWKH8QLWHG6WDWHVPD\RUPD\QRWIDOOZLWKLQ3ROLNRII¶VGHILQLWLRQ, 
or they may do so for some purposes (protection from violence, say) but not 
for others (succession rights of a surviving husband).  Even in a more benign 
polygenous environment different rules would have to apply, for example 
concerning succession rights, financial settlement on separation, and custody 
of children.  And in the world of couples, financial support after separation is 
available for ex-spouses and, in Australia, New Zealand, Canada and 
Scotland, for those who satisfy the statutory definitions of µcohabitant¶: do 
these definitionVFDSWXUHDOO WKH ³IDPLOLHV´ WKat Polikoff wishes to support?  I 
suspect that she would prefer to adopt a non-definitional approach, giving, for 
example, financial support to all those who deserve it.  But if so that begs the 
even more difficult  -  and political and judgmental  -  question of desert.  So 
she will have to fall back on a definitional approach to family entitlement, and 
define which groupings of individuals are µfamilies¶ worthy of being µvalued¶.  
Without this, a definitive appraisal of her µvaluing all families¶ approach is 
impossible. 
 
                                            
9
 See Millbank (2008). 
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These problems do not seriously detract from the value of this book, which is 
that it poses questions that everyone interested in either social policy or LGBT 
rights should be asking.  Her answers are partial, in both senses of the word, 
but for that reason alone they are thought-provoking.  The debate is likely to 
continue, on both sides of the Atlantic, for some time to come and the terms in 
which the debate is conducted will reveal much about the nature of the 
country involved.  Whether one agrees with Polikoff or not, this book is 
invaluable for any European or Australasian trying to understand the context 
in which this very American kulturkampf is being fought. 
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